Abstract. The ability of databases to organize and share data often raises privacy concerns. Data warehousing combined with data mining, bringing data from multiple sources under a single authority, increases the risk of privacy violations. Privacy preserving data mining provides a means of addressing this issue, particularly if data mining is done in a way that doesn't disclose information beyond the result. This paper presents a method for privately computing k − nn classification from distributed sources without revealing any information about the sources or their data, other than that revealed by the final classification result.
Introduction
The growing amount of information stored in different databases has lead to an increase in privacy concerns. Bringing data from multiple sources under one roof may improve processing and mining of the data, but it also increases the potential for misuse. Privacy is important, and concerns over privacy can prevent even the legitimate use of data. For example, the Data-Mining Moratorium Act introduced in the U.S. Senate would have forbid any "data-mining program" within the U.S. Department of Defense. Privacy concerns must be addressed, or such over-reaction may prevent beneficial uses of data mining.
Consider the case of a physician who wants to learn the most likely diagnosis for a patient by looking at diagnoses of similar symptoms at other hospitals. Specifically, the physician wants to use a k-nearest neighbor (k-nn) classifier to predict the disease of the patient. Revealing the patients particular test results may not be a threat to privacy (if only the physician knows the identity of the patient) but privacy of the different hospitals may be at risk. If this procedure is implemented naïvely, the researcher may learn that two patients with the same medical test results are diagnosed with different diseases in different hospitals. This could damage the reputations of the hospitals. The possibility of such incidents may prevent hospitals from participating in such a diagnostic tool. The obvious question is, can this be done without revealing anything other than the final classification? The answer is yes: This paper presents an efficient method with provable privacy properties for k-nn classification.
This work assumes data is horizontally partitioned, i.e., each database is able to construct its own k-nearest neighbors independently. The distributed problems are determining which of the local results are the closest globally, and finding the majority class of the global k-nearest neighbors. We assume that attributes of the instance that needs to be classified are not private (i.e., we do not try to protect the privacy of the query issuer); we want to protect the privacy of the data sources. The approach makes use of an untrusted, non-colluding party: a party that is not allowed to learn anything about any of the data, but is trusted not to collude with other parties to reveal information about the data.
The basic idea is that each site finds its own k-nearest neighbors, and encrypts the class with the public key of the site that sent the instance for classification (querying site). The parties compare their k-nearest neighbors with those of all other sites -except that the comparison gives each site a random share of the result, so no party learns the result of the comparison. The results from all sites are combined, scrambled, and given to the untrusted, non-colluding site. This site combines the random shares to get a comparison result for each pair, enabling it to sort and select the global k-nearest neighbors (but without learning the source or values of the items). The querying site and the untrusted, non-colluding site then engage in a protocol to find the class value. Each site learns nothing about other sites (the comparison results appears to be randomly chosen bits.) The untrusted site sees k * n encrypted results. It is able to totally order the results, but since it knows nothing about what each means or where it comes from, it learns nothing. The querying site only sees the final result.
Details of the algorithm are given in Section 3, along with a discussion of the privacy of the method. Computation and communication costs are given in Section 4. First, we discuss related work and relevant background.
Related Work
Finding the k-nearest neighbors of a multidimensional data point q [1] and building k-nn classifiers [2] have been well studied, but not in the context of security.
Interest has arisen in privacy-preserving data mining. One approach is to add "noise" to the data before the data mining process, and use techniques that mitigate the impact of the noise on the data mining results. The other approach is based on protecting the privacy of distributed sources. This was first addressed for the construction of decision trees. This work closely followed the secure multiparty computation approach discussed below, achieving "perfect" privacy, i.e., nothing is learned that could not be deduced from one's own data and the resulting tree. The key insight was to trade computation and communication cost for accuracy, improving efficiency over the generic secure multiparty computation method. Methods have since been developed for association rules, K-means and EM clustering, and generalized approaches to reducing the number of "on-line" parties required for computation. For a survey of this area see [3] . This paper falls in the latter class: privacy preserving distributed data mining work. The goal is to provably prevent disclosure of the "training data" as much as possible, disclosing only what is inherent in the classification result.
To better explain the concept of provable privacy of distributed sources, we give some background on Secure Multiparty Computation. Yao introduced a solution with his millionaire's problem: Two millionaires want to know who is richer, without disclosing their net worth [4] . Goldreich proved there is a secure solution for any functionality [5] . The idea is that the function to be computed is represented as a combinatorial circuit. The idea is based on computing random shares of each wire in the circuit: the exclusive-or of the shares is the correct value, but from its own share a party learns nothing. Each party sends a random bit to the other party for each input, and makes its own share the exclusive-or (xor) of its input and the random bit. The parties then run a cryptographic protocol to learn shares of each gate. At the end, the parties combine their shares to obtain the final result. This protocol has been proven to produce the desired result, and to do so without disclosing anything except that result.
The cost of circuit evaluation for large inputs has resulted in several algorithms for more efficiently computing specific functionality. We do make use of circuit evaluation as a subroutine for privately determining if a ≥ b. We also use the definitions and proof techniques of Secure Multiparty Computation to verify the privacy and security properties of our algorithm; these will be introduced as needed. First, we give the details of the algorithm itself.
Secure k-nn Classification
We first formally define the problem. Let R be the domain of the attributes and C be the domain of the class values. Let D i denote the database of instances at site S i . Let (x, d, k) be the query originated by site O, where x ∈ R is the instance to be classified, and d : R × R → [0, 1] is a distance function used to determine which k items are closest to x (e.g., Euclidean distance, although any metric could be used provided each site can compute d(x, x j ) for every x j in its database.) Given the data instance x, our goal is to find the k nearest neighbors of x in the union of the databases and return the class of the majority of those neighbors as the predicted class of x:
where is the projection function and Maj is the majority function. The security/privacy goal is to find C x while meeting the following criteria:
-No site except O will be able to predict C x better than looking at (x, d, k) and its own database D i (E.g., if Site S i has k points x i such that d(x, x i ) = 0, it is likely that the majority class of the x i will be the result); and -No site learns anything about the source of x i except its own. To achieve a secure and efficient solution, we make use of an untrusted, noncolluding site, an approach first suggested in [6] . Such a site learns nothing in isolation, however by colluding with other sites it could obtain information that should not be revealed. Therefore, the only trust placed in the site is that it not collude with any other sites to violate privacy. Although this seems like a strong assumption, it often occurs in real life. For example, bidders or sellers on e-bay assume that e-bay is not colluding with other bidders or sellers against them. We emphasize that the untrusted site learns nothing except the public values k and n. A diagram showing the information flow is given in Figure 1 .
The Algorithm
Given the query, each site can find its own closest k items without exchanging information. These n * k candidate items must contain the k nearest neighbors of x; what remains is to find the closest k among the candidates and return the majority class of those k instances to site O. This poses two security challenges:
1. Determining which of the n * k items are the k nearest neighbors without revealing anything about the items, where they come from, or their distance to the instance that needs to be classified; and 2. Learning the class value while disclosing it to only the originating site.
At first glance, this appears simple -have each site send their local k-nn distances and classes to a third party C. C learns the result, but also learns distances and the sites that contributes to the global k-nn result. A slightly more sophisticated approach is for C to publish a candidate distance value, and have local sites return the number of items within that distance, refining the value until k items are within the distance. Then the class value can be computed.
This still reveals the sites that contribute to the global result, the distances to the queried instance, the final classification result to C, and more. To ensure privacy concerns are met, we provide a solution that (under the non-collusion assumption) reveals nothing to any site that cannot be inferred by looking at its own data and the instance, except that O learns the final result.
The use of an untrusted third party, along with public-key encryption, makes it easy to solve challenge 2. Each site encrypts the class value with the public key of O before passing it to the non-colluding site C. The data source sites are then left out of the loop -since they never see the data again, they can learn nothing after passing their data to C (e.g., they cannot test to see if their own encrypted values match those selected for the result.) C and O will participate in a special protocol to reveal only the majority class (explained later.)
Meeting challenge 1 is more difficult. Sending the distance d(x i , x) = d i to C, even with encrypted results, reveals information about the location of the points. Instead site C is sent an n * k − 1 length vector for each point x i , containing the results of comparing x i with all other points. This enables C to order the points and select the k nearest neighbors. Since the existence of a distance metric implies a total ordering exists, and the number of points is fixed, C learns nothing.
Two problems remain. The first is that we must prevent C from learning which point comes from which site, or it can learn the source of the k nearest neighbors (among other things.) This is easily addressed -all points and their associated comparison vectors are sent to one of the data sites S s , which combines them and scrambles the order before passing them on to C. Public key encryption, using C's public key, prevents S s from learning anything.
The second issue is more challenging: How do we build the comparison vectors at site S i without S i learning about values at other sites? If two sites just compare items, they both learn something about the data at the other site (e.g., if S i 's items are all closer to x than S j 's items, both learn that S j does not have an item that contributes to the result.) For this we use the share-splitting idea from secure multiparty computation. Instead of containing the results of comparing x i with other items, the vector contains a random share of the comparison result.
Either the element of the d i vector corresponding to d j and the element of the d j vector corresponding to d i both contain 0, or they both contain 1 -0 ⊕ 0 = 1 ⊕ 1 = 0. However, knowing only one share tells nothing: a share 0 could mean either 0 ⊕ 0 = 0 or 0 ⊕ 1 = 1. From d i 's view, the share has equal probability of being 0 or 1 (a random choice), so it learns nothing.
To generate random shares of the comparison, we return to secure multiparty computation. We stop the generic circuit comparison method before combining shares to learn the final result. In other words, given two integers a and b, secure comparison of a, b (f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * −→ {0, 1} × {0, 1}) is defined as follows:
where each site sees only one component of the function output. This states that if a > b the xor of the shares of the participating sites will be 1, otherwise the xor of the shares will be 0. Using this function, each site can compare its elements with all other elements and learn nothing about the result of the comparisons. Two additional details. First, the identifiers used to track the d j in the comparison share vector for d i must not disclose anything. One option would be for the combining site S s to assign identifiers, but this would require independent encryption of the single bits of the comparison shares, and single bit encryption is problematic. Instead, each site generates pseudo-random unique identifiers site C cannot distinguish from random. One simple and secure way to handle this problem is using a pseudo-random permutation function. With a fixed key, DES is assumed to be such a function. The sites agree on a key K, and each site S i generates k identifiers by evaluating
Since encryption is assumed to be secure and a permutation, each site will get non-intersecting identifiers that appear random to any (polynomial time) adversary not knowing K (in particular, C). The identifiers are also used to determine which of a comparison pair will be the left-hand side in a comparison: The item with the smaller identifier corresponds to x in the comparison function f (x, y).
The second detail is equality. Identifying that two items are at equal distances reveals information. We must disambiguate consistently, without giving even a probabilistic estimate on the likelihood of equality. The solution is to add extra low-order bits to each distance, based on a unique mapping from the identifier that appears random to C -the same trick used to generate identifiers. The distance used for comparison is actually d||E u (ik + j), where the encryption function E is as above, but with a different key. This ensures that distances are unique, guaranteeing a total ordering of equal distances.
Protocol 1 gives the algorithm details. Note that at the end of the k-nearest neighbor selection phase, C has the class of the k-nearest neighbors encrypted with E o . Assuming the usage of Blum-Goldwasser encryption, each class value class i will have ciphertext of the form (ŕ, class i ⊕ r), where O has enough information to determine r givenŕ, enabling decryption to get class i . Instead of sending these values to O, C will xor each of these values with a random value r i . C then sends (ŕ, class i ⊕ r ⊕ r i ) to O. O decrypts to get class i = class i ⊕ r i , indistinguishable (to O) from a random value. O and C now use the generic secure circuit evaluation approach to evaluate the majority function:
This is a simple circuit with size complexity dependent on k and number of distinct classes. The cost is dominated by the k-nearest neighbor selection phase.
To clarify, we give an example for k = 1 and n = 3. 
Find r usingŕ and the private key
Find Maj from the random shares of C and NR d using secure circuit evaluation.
learns that its share should be 1 ⊕ 0 = 1. (Neither S 2 or S 1 learns the other's share, or the comparison result.) Secure comparisons with the other sites are performed, giving each site tuples containing its share of the comparison with all other items. These are encrypted with C's public key to give: E c ((1, 1), (2, 0) ), E o (c 1 )) E c ((2, 1), (3, 0) ), E o (c 2 )) S 3 : (2, E c ((1, 1), (3, 1) ), E o (c 3 ))
The above are sent to S 3 , which permutes the set, strips source information, and sends it to C. Site C decrypts the comparison share vectors to get: (2, ((1, 1), (3, 1) ), E o (c 3 )) (3, ((1, 1), (2, 0) 
C now compares the items to find the nearest neighbor. As an example, to compare items 2 and 3, we take the pair (3, 1) from the first (2) row and the pair (2, 0) from the second (3) 
Security of the Protocol
We now prove that Protocol 1 is secure. We assume that sites O and C are not among the S i . We have discussed the need for C being a separate site. O cannot be a data source, as it would be able to recognize its own E o (x) among the results, thus knowing if it was the source of some of the k nearest neighbors.
To define security we use definitions from the Secure Multiparty Computation community, specifically security in the semi-honest model. Loosely speaking, a semi-honest party follows the rules of the protocol, but is free to try to learn additional information from what it sees during the execution of the protocol.
The formal definition is given in [7] . Basically, it states that the view of each party during the execution of the protocol can be effectively simulated knowing only the input and the output of that party. Extending this definition to multiple parties is straightforward. The key idea is that of simulation: If we can simulate what is seen during execution of the protocol knowing only our own input and our portion of the final output, then we haven't learned anything from the information exchanged in a real execution of the protocol. Under certain assumptions, we can extend our protocols to malicious parties (those that need not follow the protocol). Due to space limitations we omit the discussion here.
We need one additional tool to prove the security of the protocol. The encrypted items seen by S s and C during execution of the protocol may disclose some information. The problem is that two items corresponding to the same plaintext map to the same ciphertext. If multiple items are of the same class (as would be expected in k-nn classification), the permuting site S s would learn the class entropy in the k-nn of each site as well as the number of identical results between sites. The comparison site C would learn this for the data as a whole. Neither learns the result, but something of the distribution is revealed.
Fortunately, the cryptography community has a solution: probabilistic publickey encryption. The idea is that the same plaintext may map to different ciphertexts, but these will all map back to the same plaintext when decrypted. Using probabilistic public-key encryption for E o allows us to show Protocol 1 is secure. (Deterministic public-key encryption is acceptable for E c , as the set of nk − 1 identifiers in the set v are different for every item, so no two plaintexts are the same.) The Blum-Goldwasser probabilistic encryption scheme [8] , with a cipher text of the form (ŕ, M ⊕ r) for message M , is one example. In this, givenŕ and the private key, it is possible to compute r to recover the original message.
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 privately computes the k-nn classification in the semihonest model where there is no collusion; only site O learns the result.
Proof. To show that Protocol 1 is secure under the semi-honest model, we must demonstrate that what each site sees during the execution of the protocol can be simulated in polynomial time using only its own input and output. Specifically, the output of the simulation and the view seen during the execution must be computationally indistinguishable. We also use the general composition theorem for semi-honest computation: if g securely reduces to f and there is a way to compute f securely, then there is a way to compute g securely. In our context, f is the secure comparison of distances, and g is Protocol 1. We show that our protocol uses comparison in a way that reveals nothing.
We first define the simulator for the view of site S i . Before the comparison phase, S i can compute its view from its own input. The comparison phase involves communication, so simulation is more difficult. If we look at a single comparison, S i sees several things. First, it sees the identifier R h [j].id. Since S i knows E K , h, and j; the simulator can generate the exact identifier, so the simulator view is identical to the actual view. It also sees a share of the comparison result. If i = h, S i generates the values locally, and the simulator does the same. If not local, there are two possibilities. If id > R h [j] .id, it holds the second argument, and generates a random bit as its share of the comparison result. The simulator does the same. Otherwise, the secure comparison will generate S i 's share of the comparison. Assume d < R h [j].d: S i 's share is 0 ⊕ r, where r is S h 's randomly chosen share. Assuming S h is equally likely to generate a 1 or 0, the probability that S i 's share is 1 is 0.5. This is independent of the input -thus, a simulator that generates a random bit has the same likelihood of generating a 1 as S i 's view in the real protocol. The composition theorem (and prior work on secure comparison) shows the algorithm so far is privacy preserving.
We can extend this argument to the entire set of comparisons seen by S i during execution of the protocol. The probability that the simulator will output a particular binary string x for a given sequence of comparisons is 1 2 nk−1 . Since actual shares of the comparison result are chosen randomly from a uniform distribution, the same probability holds for seeing x during actual execution:
Therefore, the distribution of the simulator and the view is the same for the entire result vectors. Everything else is simulated exactly, so the views are computationally indistinguishable. Nothing is learned during the comparison phase.
The sites S i now encrypt the result vectors; again the simulator mimics the actual protocol. Since the sources were indistinguishable, the results are as well.
The next step is to show that S s learns nothing from receiving ER i . Site S s can generate the identifiers ER i [j] .id it will receive, as in simulating the comparison phase. By the security definitions of encryption, the E c (v) must be computationally indistinguishable from randomly generated strings of the same length as the encrypted values, provided no two v are equal (which they cannot be, as discussed above.) Likewise, the definition of probabilistic encryption ensures that the E o (x) are computationally indistinguishable from randomly generated strings of the same length. Since E c and E o are public, S s knows the length of the generated strings. The simulator chooses a random string from the domain of E c and E o ; the result is computationally indistinguishable from the view seen during execution of the protocol. (If S s is one of the S i , the simulator must reuse the ER s generated during the comparison simulation instead of generating a new one.) C receives n * k tuples consisting of an identifier, an encrypted comparison set v, and encrypted class value E o (c). Since the identifiers are created with an encryption key unknown to C, the values are computationally indistinguishable from random values. The simulator for C randomly selects k * n identifiers from a uniform distribution on the domain of ER i . The outcomes E o (c) are simulated the same as by S s above. The hardest part to simulate is the comparison set. Since the comparison produces a total ordering, C cannot simply generate random comparison results. Instead, the simulator for C picks an identifier i 1 to be the closest, and generates a comparison set consisting of all the other identifiers and randomly chosen bits corresponding to the result shares. It then inserts into the comparison set for each other identifier i k the tuple consisting of i 1 and the appropriate bit so that the comparison of i 1 with i k will show i 1 as closest to q. For example, if i 1 ≥ i k , then f (i k , i 1 ) should be 1. If the bit for i 1 's share is chosen to be 0, the tuple (i 1 , 1) is placed in i k 's comparison set. By the same argument used in the comparison phase, this simulator generates comparison values that are computationally indistinguishable from the view seen by C. Since the actual identifiers are computationally indistinguishable, and the value of the comparison is independent of the identifier value, the order of identifiers generated by C is computationally indistinguishable from the order in the real execution. The simulator encrypts these sets with E c to simulate the data received.
In We have shown that there is a simulator for each site whose output is computationally indistinguishable from the view seen by that site during execution of the protocol. Therefore, the protocol is secure in the semi-honest model.
The algorithm actually protects privacy in the presence of malicious parties, providing O and C do not collude. The proof is omitted due to space restrictions.
Communication and Computation Cost Analysis
Privacy is not free. Assume m is the size required to represent the distance, and q bits are required to represent the result. A simple insecure distributed k-nn protocol would have the S i send their k nearest neighbor distances/results to O, for O(nk(m+ q)) bit communication cost. The computation by O could easily be done in O(nk log(k)) comparisons. (One pass through the data, inserting each item into the appropriate place in the running list of the k nearest neighbors.) Although we do not claim this is optimal, it makes an interesting reference point.
In ). The parallelism inherent in a distributed system has a strong impact on the execution time. Since the secure comparisons may proceed in parallel, the time complexity O(nk 2 mt 3 ). Batching the comparisons between each pair of sites allows all comparisons to be done in a constant number of rounds. Thus, the dominating time factor would appear to be decryption of the nk comparison sets, each of size O(nk). Note that m must be greater than log(nk) to ensure no equality in distances, so unless n is large relative to the other values the comparisons are still likely to dominate. Once decrypted, efficient indexing of the comparison vectors allows the same O(nk log(k)) cost to determine the k nearest neighbor as in the simple insecure protocol described above.
A more interesting comparison is with a fully secure k-nn algorithm based directly on secure circuit evaluation. For n parties and a circuit of size C, the generic method requires O(n 2 C) 1 out of 2 oblivious transfers: a communication complexity O(n 2 Ct). To compare with the generic method, we need a lower bound on the size of a circuit for k-nn classification on nk (m + q)-bit inputs. An obvious lower bound is Ω (nk(m + q) ): the circuit must (at least) be able to process all data. This gives a bit complexity of O(n 2 nk(m + q)t). Our method clearly wins if n > k and is asymptotically superior for fixed k; for n ≤ k the question rests on the complexity of an optimal circuit for k-nn classification.
Conclusions
We have presented a provably secure algorithm for computing k-nn classification from distributed sources. The method we have presented is not cheap -O(n 2 k 2 ) where n is the number of sites -but when the alternative is not performing the task at all due to privacy concerns, this cost is probably acceptable. This leads us to ask about lower bounds: can we prove that privacy is not free. Privacy advocates often view privacy versus obtaining knowledge from data as an either/or situation. Demonstrating that knowledge can be obtained while maintaining privacy, and quantifying the associated costs, enables more reasoned debate.
